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Abstract
This paper provides new tools for philosophical argument analysis and fresh empiri-
cal foundations for ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy. Language comprehension
routinely involves stereotypical inferences with contextual defeaters. J.L. Austin’s
Sense and Sensibilia first mooted the idea that contextually inappropriate stereotypi-
cal inferences from verbal case-descriptions drive some philosophical paradoxes; these
engender philosophical problems that can be resolved by exposing the underlying fal-
lacies. We build on psycholinguistic research on salience effects to explain when and
why even perfectly competent speakers cannot help making stereotypical inferences
which are contextually inappropriate. We analyse a classical paradox about perception
(‘argument from illusion’), suggest it relies on contextually inappropriate stereotypical
inferences from appearance-verbs, and show that the conditions we identified as lead-
ing to contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are met in formulations of
the paradox. Three experiments use a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to doc-
ument the predicted inappropriate inferences, in English, German, and Japanese. The
cross-linguistic study allows us to assess the wider relevance of the proposed analysis.
Our findings open up new perspectives for ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy.
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Some words bewitch. So do some senses. Among these are dominant senses
of polysemous words, namely when they are (in ways to be explained) ‘functional’
for the interpretation of more rarefied uses: Even in competent speakers, such less
salient uses then predictably prompt stereotypical inferences licensed by the domi-
nant sense or use but not by the less salient sense or use demanded by the context.
Such contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are at the root of some philo-
sophical paradoxes and problems. These two hypotheses, one psycholinguistic, the
other metaphilosophical, promise to jointly provide fresh foundations for the best
known critical project in ordinary language philosophy, initiated by J.L. Austin (1962),
which addresses philosophical problems by disentangling contextually inappropriate
default inferences. We will examine the two hypotheses through experiments on infer-
ences from appearance verbs and by following up the suggestion that the contextually
inappropriate inferences we document are at the root of a classical paradox about
perception, known as ‘argument from illusion’. This philosophically motivated exer-
cise in experimental pragmatics will forge fresh connections between experimental
philosophy and ordinary language philosophy.
The rise of experimental philosophy has contributed to renewed interest in ordinary
language philosophy (OLP) (Fischer 2011; Baz 2012, 2016; Garvey 2014; Gustafsson
and Sørli 2011; Hansen 2014, 2018; Laugier 2013). OLP was analytic philosophy’s first
attempt to overcome limitations of armchair reflection through the use of (informal)
experiments (Hansen and Chemla 2015), (peer-based) focus groups (Urmson 1969),
and empirical surveys (Murphy 2014).1 Forging fresh connections between experi-
mental philosophy and its historical precursor, this paper will draw on inspiration from
OLP to recruit psycholinguistic methods and findings for further development of one
main strand of experimental philosophy’s ‘evidential’ research programme (Sytsma
and Livengood 2016, pp. 40–42). We will explore how ideas pioneered by OLP’s
‘critical’ Austinian strand, exemplified by Sense and Sensibilia (Austin 1962),2 can
help develop the prominently discussed ‘restrictionist’ strand of evidential experimen-
tal philosophy (reviews: Mallon 2016; Stich and Tobia 2016), into an ‘experimental
philosophy 2.0’ (Nado 2016).
Restrictionism seeks to debunk intuitions adduced as evidence for philosophical
claims and theories (reviews: Alexander 2012, pp. 70–89; Horvath 2010) and—more
recently—to ‘dissolve’ certain philosophical problems (Weinberg 2017, p. 179). A first
generation of contributions sought to assess the evidentiary value of philosophically
relevant intuitions. These studies examined the sensitivity of such intuitions to pre-
sumably irrelevant parameters, and inferred lack of evidentiary value from observed
sensitivity to demographic parameters, order and framing effects. This research met
1
‘OLP’ is a family resemblance concept (cf. Baz 2016, p. 112) associated with several related paradigms.
These include two precursors of experimental philosophy: J.L. Austin (e.g., 1957, 1962) and Arne Naess
(e.g., 1956, 1961). This paper develops Austinian ideas. For Naess, and methodological debates between
the two camps, see Murphy (2014) and cf. Hansen (2017).
2 OLP’s other, ‘constructive’ main strand, exemplified by Austin (1957), is continued, e.g., by experimental
work on epistemic contextualism (Gerken and Beebe 2016; Grindrod et al. 2018; Hansen and Chemla 2013;
Schaffer and Knobe 2012).
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with empirical and theoretical challenges: Studies on demographic parameters (age,
gender, etc.) encountered replication difficulties (review: Machery 2017, ch. 2) exceed-
ing those of experimental philosophy as a whole (Cova 2018); the inference from
apparent order effects to lack of evidentiary value was forcefully questioned (Horne
and Livengood 2017); and critics maintained that philosophers do not rely on intu-
itions as evidence in the way restrictionism presupposes (Cappelen 2012; Deutsch
2015; Williamson 2007). Partially in response to these difficulties, recent calls for
an ‘experimental philosophy 2.0’ (Nado 2016) suggest that evidential experimental
philosophers should, instead, (1) examine cognitive processes that underpin philosoph-
ical thought (paradigm: Nichols and Knobe 2007), (2) seek to develop epistemological
profiles of such processes, which indicate under which conditions we may (not) trust
their outputs (Weinberg 2015, 2016), and (3) assess a wider range of outputs: not only
intuitive judgments but also inferences in arguments (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017).
At this point in the development of evidential experimental philosophy, OLP’s crit-
ical Austinian strand provides fresh inspiration: Austin (1962) considered defeasible
default inferences which are shaped by ordinary uses of words, and sought to ‘dissolve’
philosophical problems by disentangling such inferences. Defeasible default infer-
ences continuously occur in language comprehension and production—e.g., whenever
thinkers read or state verbal case-descriptions or premises of arguments. This paper
conceptualises relevant inferences, in a neo-Gricean framework, as part-and-parcel of
‘stereotypical enrichment’ (Levinson 2000). In the spirit of experimental philosophy
2.0, we (1) experimentally examine this key cognitive process which can shape thought
in any area of philosophy, in order to (2) contribute towards an epistemological profile
of stereotypical enrichment and, on this basis, (3) assess how stereotypical inferences
influence philosophical argument, for better or worse. In the spirit of critical OLP,
we explore to what extent our findings can contribute to resolving a philosophical
paradox and ‘dissolving’ a problem it engenders. For this purpose, we chose the clas-
sical paradox about perception (‘argument from illusion’) targeted by Austin’s Sense
and Sensibilia (1962). Together with related paradoxes, it engenders the ‘problem of
perception’, a renewed focus of debate (Crane and French 2015; Fish 2009; Robinson
2001; Smith 2002). We thus seek to trial the application of psycholinguistic methods
and findings in philosophical argument analysis and to provide proof of concept for
experimental implementation of Austin’s critical project: an ‘experimental ordinary
language philosophy (2.0)’.
We now empirically substantiate Austinian ideas about defeasible default inferences
from words by reviewing psycholinguistic findings about stereotypical inferences and
their contextual integration (Sect. 2). We then draw on psycholinguistic research on
salience effects (Fein et al. 2015; Giora 2003) to contribute to an epistemological profile
of stereotypical enrichment and identify vitiating conditions under which the process
leads to inappropriate inferences (Sect. 3). Three experiments on inferences from
appearance verbs evaluate our psycholinguistic hypothesis that, under the conditions
identified, even competent language users make and accept contextually inappropri-
ate stereotypical inferences. To show that our findings are not merely reflective of
idiosyncrasies in English and to assess their philosophical relevance, we follow up an
English study (Sect. 4) with replications in languages with different sentence posi-
tions for verbs, viz., German (Sect. 5) and Japanese (Sect. 6). Finally, we deploy
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these empirical findings to develop the metaphilosophical hypothesis that contextu-
ally inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs are at the root of the
‘argument from illusion’, and explore how psycholinguistic findings can contribute to
‘dissolving’ the ‘problem of perception’ (Sect. 7). We thus aim to provide proof of
concept for a more widely applicable approach that adresses certain kinds of problems
by developing and empirically investigating psycholinguistic (and metaphilosophical)
hypotheses which are also interesting in their own right.
2 Stereotypical enrichment
Much of Sense and Sensibilia discusses default inferences from words which have
subtle contextual defeaters. Without the benefit of the conceptual apparatus available
today, Austin sought to clarify ‘the root ideas behind the uses of’, e.g., appearance verbs
‘look’, ‘appear’, and ‘seem’ (Austin 1962, p. 37) which are employed in the initial
premises of the paradox he targeted in that work. He considered example sentences
and ‘in just what circumstances we would say which, and why’ (p. 36), e.g., (cf. Price
1932, p. 28):
1. ‘The hill looks steep’—[it has the look of a steep hill];
2. ‘The hill appears steep’—when you look at it from down here;
3. ‘The hill seems steep’—to judge by the fact that we had to change gear twice.
Such examples suggest that while ‘looks’ is used simply to comment on the look
of things, ‘appears’ ‘would typically be used with reference to certain special cir-
cumstances’ affecting judgment, and ‘seems’ ‘makes an implicit reference to certain
[inconclusive] evidence’ supporting judgment (Austin 1962, pp. 36–37). If this is cor-
rect, hearers will tend to infer S is inclined to judge/think that X is F from ‘X appears
F to S’ and ‘X seems F to S’, but not from ‘X looks F to S’ (Fischer 2014a).
Simultaneously, Austin stresses the radical context-sensitivity of inferences made
or anticipated in language-comprehension and -production:
‘If I say that petrol looks like water, I am simply commenting on the way petrol
looks; I am under no temptation to think, nor do I imply, that perhaps petrol is
water. […] But ‘This looks like water’ … may be a different matter; if I don’t
already know what ‘this’ is, I may be taking the fact that it looks like water as a
ground for thinking it is water’ (Austin 1962, pp. 40–41).
Therefore, ‘just what is meant and what can be inferred (if anything) can be decided
only by examining the full circumstances in which the words are used’ (p. 41): Under
some circumstances, ‘X looks F (to S)’ may prompt and warrant a doxastic inference
to S is inclined to think that X is F, which otherwise is the preserve of ‘seem’ and
‘appear’.
Psycholinguistic research has since substantiated both general suggestions: that
the use of particular words is associated with ‘root ideas’ which facilitate defeasible
default inferences; and that inferences—appropriately—made from uses of words
depend upon sentence- and, indeed, utterance-context. In today’s terms, Austin’s ‘root
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ideas’ are stereotypes; and the ‘root ideas’ associated with the verbs of interest are
generalised situation schemas.
As traditionally conceived, stereotypes are sets of features (categories, properties,
relations, etc.) which come to mind first, and are easiest to process, when we hear a
noun, verb, or idiomatic expression. In the simplest examples, relevant features can be
elicited through listing or sentence-completion tasks (‘Tomatoes are__’) (e.g., McRae
et al. 1997). Single words activate features rapidly (within 250 ms), as shown by
priming experiments (Balota and Lorch 1986; Ferretti et al. 2001; Hare et al. 2009;
Lupker 1984; Welke et al. 2015).3 According to standard accounts of semantic memory
(McRae and Jones 2013; Neely and Kahan 2001), stereotypical associations between
things and their features (properties, relations, etc.), parts and wholes, causes and
effects are built up through observed co-occurrences in the physical environment and
linguistic representations. Strength of stereotypical association thus encodes informa-
tion about the world.
Stereotypical associations do not determine the extension of words (Hampton and
Passanisi 2016), but support automatic default inferences from words to features
stereotypically associated with them. Such stereotypical inferences have been studied
through reading times (Garrod and Sanford 1981; McKoon and Ratcliff 1980; O’Brien
and Albrecht 1992), eye movements (Patson and Warren 2010; Rayner 1998), and
event-related brain potentials (ERPs) (Kutas and Federmeier 2000, 2011). In these
studies, participants read sentences where the expression of interest is followed by a
sequel inconsistent with a hypothesised inference. Conflicts lead readers to slow down
and make more backwards eye-movements; they also prompt signature electrophysi-
ological responses (known as ‘N400s’). For example, when reading ‘sewing’, people
rapidly infer the agent used a needle—and slow down when the text continues ‘…the
job would be easier if Carol had a needle’ (Harmon-Vukic et al. 2009).
Event nouns (Hare et al. 2009) and verbs (e.g., Ferretti et al. 2001) can be associ-
ated with complex stereotypes: Where the actions or events denoted typically involve
particular (kinds of) agents, patients acted on, instruments, or relations between
them (Tanenhaus et al. 1989), associated stereotypes include typical features of
these role-fillers. For example, ‘frighten’ immediately brings to mind agent-properties
mean, ugly, and big, as well as patient properties including small and weak (McRae
et al. 1997). In incremental language comprehension, these complex stereotypes are
deployed in a structured manner: Sentence fragments (‘She was arrested by the ___’)
activate typical agents (cop) in post-verbal position only when they leave the agent
role blank (as above), not when they leave open the patient (‘She arrested the ___’)
(Ferretti et al. 2001).4 These complex, structured stereotypes are known as generalised
3 Participants are presented with a ‘prime’ word or short text and then a ‘probe’ word or letter string, and
have to, e.g., read out the word or decide whether the string forms a word. That the prime activates the probe
concept, i.e., makes it more accessible and likely to be used by cognitive processes (from word recognition
to forward-inferencing), is inferred from shorter response times (Lucas 2000).
4 Similarly, while ERP studies show the verb is expected (as indicated by reduced N400 amplitude), where
preceded by subject and object (‘The restaurant owner forgot which customer the waitress had served…’),
even where their typical roles are reversed (‘…which waitress the customer had served’) (Chow et al. 2016),
this reversal prompts signature electrophysiological responses to syntactic violations (known as ‘enhanced
P600’). This suggests that participants expected the verb in the passive voice (‘which waitress the customer
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situation schemas (Rumelhart 1978; Tanenhaus et al. 1989). If Austin is right, the sit-
uation schemas associated with ‘X appears F to S’ and ‘X seems F to S’ include the
patient-feature S is inclined to judge that X is F.
The radical context-sensitivity of comprehension inferences that Austin noted par-
tially arises from the fact that inferences made from the verb can take into account
previous agent and instrument nouns. Self-paced reading-time studies found that par-
ticipants read the remainder of the sentence more slowly when subject and verb
were followed by a patient atypical for that particular agent-action pairing (‘The
mechanic/journalist checked the spelling of his latest report’) (Bicknell et al. 2010).
A similar finding was made for instruments (‘Susan used the saw/scissors to cut the
expensive paper…’), despite the absence of single-word priming of typical patients
(e.g., ‘scissors’-paper) (Matsuki et al. 2011). These findings suggest that reading acti-
vates not only knowledge about the typical features of, say, journalists and mechanics,
or of checking events, but also more specific knowledge about what mechanics check
that does not get activated by single words. ERP and eye-tracking studies suggest
that inferences supported by activation of such specific knowledge were made at the
earliest possible moment, i.e., right after the verb (Bicknell et al. 2010; Kamide et al.
2003). In incremental comprehension, hearers/readers immediately employ knowl-
edge encoded in event schemas of varying degrees of complexity and specificity, the
moment their relevance becomes apparent. These schemas go beyond schemas asso-
ciated with specific words and include generalised situation schemas which encode
empirical knowledge about events, but are not associated with any one word.
In accordance with the I-heuristic (‘What is expressed simply is stereotypically
exemplified’, Levinson 2000, p. 37), hearers deploy such schemas and speakers antic-
ipate their use, to devise or facilitate interpretations that are positive, stereotypical,
and highly specific (op.cit. pp. 114–115), in the process of stereotypical enrichment:
(I-speaker) Skip mention of stereotypical features but make deviations from stereo-
types explicit.
(I-hearer) In the absence of such explicit indications to the contrary, assume that the
situation talked about conforms to the relevant schemas, deploy the most
specific schemas relevant, and fill in detail in line with this knowledge
about situations of the kind at issue.
The research reviewed supports what we call a ‘cued schemas account’ of language
comprehension and production: Articulation of speech proceeds at a slower pace than
pre-articulation in speech production (Wheeldon and Levelt 1995) or parsing- and
inference-processes in comprehension (Mehler et al. 1993). Inferences based on cued
schemas (‘stereotypical inferences’, in a wider sense) help mitigate this ‘communi-
cation bottleneck’: Words and syntactic constructions (Goldberg 2003; along with
verb aspect: Ferretti et al. 2007; Kehler et al. 2008) are used as complementary cues
for indicating and accessing relevant empirical knowledge in incremental language
comprehension and production (Elman 2009). Relevant knowledge is encoded by
Footnote 4 continued
had been served by’), consistent with assignments of agent and patient-roles typical for the verb (Kim et al.
2016; cf. Kim and Osterhout 2005).
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stereotypes, in particular situation schemas. Increasingly specific schemas are acti-
vated by words and combinations of verbs and agent- or patient-nouns, as well as
discourse context (Metusalem et al. 2012). Activated schemas then support a multi-
tude of rapid, parallel stereotypical inferences. At each point, receivers use the most
specific inferences to flesh out utterance content. The activation processes in semantic
memory that support these inferences occur in both comprehension and production
(Pickering and Garrod 2013; Stephens et al. 2010). Psycholinguistic findings there-
fore provide empirical support for Austin’s (1962, pp. 40–41) suggestion that while
words are associated with ‘root ideas’, how they are ‘intended and taken’ in ordinary
discourse depends upon the utterance-context.
3 Contextually inappropriate inferences
Austin (1962, pp. 4–5) also moots the idea that some philosophical paradoxes and
problems turn on contextually inappropriate default inferences, so they can be resolved
by exposing such inappropriate inferences. This idea provides the metaphilosophical
foundation of Austin’s brand of critical ordinary language philosophy. This key idea,
however, faces a serious challenge: As we have just seen, how competent speak-
ers intend and interpret words is highly sensitive to utterance context. Philosophers
formulating and addressing paradoxes are competent speakers. Austin’s empirically
confirmed positive point about the context-sensitivity of comprehension inferences
thus seems to undercut the rationale of his critical project, and motivates the question:
Exactly when (if ever) and why should competent speakers (like philosophers) make,
or fall for, contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences, in formulating their
arguments or problems?
This question is rendered yet more pressing by the ‘paradox of charity’ (Lewinski
2012; cf. Adler 1994): Hermeneutic principles of charity constrain attributions of falla-
cies to competent thinkers. To warrant such attributions, any ‘diagnostic’ analysis that
seeks to identify fallacies in philosophical paradoxes has to be supported by empirical
explanations that let us understand when and why competent thinkers commit those
fallacies (Thagard and Nisbett 1983). Austin’s general approach as well as ‘diagnostic’
responses to specific philosophical problems require empirical validation.
To provide empirical foundations for Austin’s general approach, and diagnostic
argument analysis more generally, we will develop and experimentally test a psy-
cholinguistic explanation that identifies one relevant set of conditions under which
even competent speakers make contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences
(Sects. 3–6). Then we will explore to what extent our findings support a specific philo-
sophical application, namely, a diagnostic reconstruction of Austin’s chief target, the
‘argument from illusion’, which identifies inappropriate stereotypical inferences from
appearance-verbs as the root of this paradox (Sect. 7). We now draw on psycholin-
guistic research on salience effects to explain when and why competent speakers go
along with contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences (Sect. 3.1). Then we
review empirical evidence concerning appearance verbs (Sect. 3.2). This will allow us





Most words have more than one meaning or sense (Klein and Murphy 2001). Whenever
we hear or read them, all their meanings or senses get initially activated (Fodor 1983;
Simpson and Burgess 1985; Till et al. 1988). That is, a linguistic stimulus activates all
(sets of) semantic and stereotypical features associated with the expression, in any of
its senses. It does so regardless of contextual relevance. For example, the homophonous
word ‘mint’ activates candy rapidly and strongly, even where used in a less frequent
meaning (‘All buildings collapsed except the mint’) (Till et al. 1988).
Purely stimulus-driven activation processes run in parallel with context-sensitive
processes (Giora 2003; Levinson 2000; Peleg and Giora 2011) that are driven, inter
alia, by more specific situation schemas activated in incremental comprehension (Sect.
2). Their outputs are continuously integrated via processes such as reinforcement
and decay (Oden and Spira 1983), and more effortful suppression (Faust and Gerns-
bacher 1996). Thus, initial activation is mitigated in the light of context (‘the secretary
scratched his beard’) (Sturt 2003) and explicit indications of deviation from relevant
stereotypes (‘male secretary’) (Osterhout et al. 1997), including situation schemas and
scripts (Traxler et al. 2000). We now build up towards conditions under which initially
activated stereotypical features remain activated in inappropriate contexts, even so,
and influence further cognitive processing.
According to the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Fein et al. 2015; Giora 2003), initial
activation is ordered by ‘salience’ (where this label is applied to a magnitude that is
insensitive to immediate discourse context): The (non-contextual) salience of a sense
or use is a function of exposure frequency (how often a language user encounters
the word in that use), modulated by prototypicality.5 The more salient a use is for a
speaker/hearer, the more rapidly and strongly the situation schema associated with
that use is activated. Highly salient uses will strongly activate the associated situation
schema, regardless of contextual (im)propriety. The more strongly activated a schema
is, the longer its activation takes to decay (Farah and McClelland 1991; Loftus 1973)
and the more effortful it is to suppress (De Neys et al. 2003; Levy and Anderson 2002;
Giora 1997).
When the word is used in a different, less salient sense, context-sensitive processes
may lead to suppression of the initially activated, but contextually inappropriate, dom-
inant schema that is associated with the most salient sense. This happens, specifically,
where the less salient sense is associated with an entirely different schema whose acti-
vation is enhanced by explicit marking of the less salient sense (Givoni et al. 2013).
But the less salient sense need not be associated with an entirely different schema.
Rather, according to the Retention/Suppression Hypothesis (Giora 2003; Giora et al.
2014), its interpretation (e.g., ‘I see your point’) may involve retaining the dominant
schema and suppressing its contextually inappropriate features (agent S uses her eyes;
patient X is located in front of S, etc.) while deploying the contextually relevant ones (S
knows what X is) (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019). This ‘retention strategy’ (for short)
5 Since exposure frequency cannot be directly measured, it is inferred from occurrence frequencies in cor-
pora or from familiarity and conventionality ratings, leading to the early, but not strictly accurate, explanation
of (non-contextual) salience as a function of ‘frequency, familiarity, conventionality, and prototypicality’
(e.g., Giora 2003, pp. 15–22). Giora now concurs with the above explication (personal communication).
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has been shown to be used in interpreting irony (Giora et al. 2007b), sarcasm (Fein
et al. 2015), and metaphor (Giora et al. 2007a; Giora and Fein 1999).
Under some conditions, suppression of irrelevant features will remain partial:
Where a word
1. is frequently used and
2. has a dominant sense that is far more salient than the others,
the semantic and stereotypical features that make up its associated situation schema
may go together so often that initial stimulus-driven activation (due to salience) will
be complemented by lateral activation between frequently co-occurring features, as
elements of a situation schema activate others (Hare et al. 2009; McRae et al. 2005).
It will then be difficult to suppress only some, but not all of them, when
3. the retention strategy is used to interpret less salient uses.
Where suppression of contextually irrelevant features remains partial, these irrelevant
schema components will support contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences
which are presupposed in further reasoning. We have thus built up to a set of jointly
vitiating conditions—(1) to (3)—in which stereotypical enrichment leads to contextu-
ally inappropriate inferences, despite the general context-sensitivity of comprehension
inferences noted already by Austin (1962, pp. 40–41). These conditions are articulated
by the Salience Bias Hypothesis (SBH) (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019, under review):
SBH When frequently used polysemous words have a clearly dominant sense or
use whose associated schema is deployed in interpreting less salient uses, the
latter uses will prompt inferences licensed (only) by the dominant sense, also
in inappropriate contexts.
Conclusions of these inappropriate inferences are particularly likely to go through
and influence further reasoning
(a) where an uninformative context fails to trigger further comprehension inferences
that have a bearing on the truth of those conclusions, and
(b) where any incompatible comprehension inferences from previous text are sup-
ported by considerably weaker stereotypical associations than those that need
suppressing—which then duly sideline the weak competition (Foss and Speer
1991; Morris 1994).
To derive from the general SBH some word-specific hypotheses which are exper-
imentally testable, we first need to identify words which fit the bill: high-frequency
words with a dominant sense deployed in interpreting less salient uses. Fischer and
Engelhardt (2017, 2019, under review) combined a comprehension task with pupil-
lometry and reading-time measurements, respectively, to examine inferences from
perception verbs, and provided evidence of inappropriate stereotypical inferences from
less salient uses of ‘see’. We now turn to a new, if related, word class, the appearance
verbs ‘look’, ‘appear’, and ‘seem’, and extend the investigation in two critical ways
that will allow us to gauge the potential relevance of the inappropriate inferences
identified by the SBH: We will investigate how robust stereotypical inferences from
verbs are in the light of competing pragmatic inferences that may defeat them, and
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will examine this not only for English but also for languages with verb-final sentence
structure which accord stereotypical inferences from verbs less influence on utterance
interpretation.
3.2 Appearance-verbs
The philosophically most relevant use of appearance verbs is with adjectival com-
plement or infinitive. Only one dictionary-attested sense of ‘appear’ (MEDAL 1, OD
2), ‘seem’ (MEDAL 1, OD 1), and ‘look’ (OD 3, though counted as two senses in
MEDAL, 3 and 5) allows these syntactic constructions.6 For all three verbs, this sense
is characterised identically (WordNet) or almost identically (MEDAL, OD), suggesting
that, in conjunction with the relevant syntactic cues (Goldberg 2003), all three verbs
rapidly (ibid.) activate the same associated situation schema (‘appearance schema’).7
This schema combines doxastic and experiential elements: ‘give a certain impres-
sion or have a certain outward aspect’ (see also WordNet). Brogaard (2013, 2014)
argues that, in their intransitive sense (‘Joe looks dirty’), appearance verbs function
as subject-raising verbs (Postal 1973) which are semantically unrelated to their gram-
matical subjects (‘Joe’) and serve not so much to predicate any property from their
complement (dirtiness) of those subjects’ referents (Joe) as to attribute to the often
implicit patient an experiential, epistemic, or doxastic attitude towards a content (Joe
is dirty).
To examine to what extent appearance verbs are stereotypically associated with
these different patient properties, Fischer et al. (2015) conducted a distributional
semantic analysis (Erk 2012) of the intransitive use of the verbs in a large corpus
(a parsed Wikipedia snapshot, which disambiguates polysemous words on the basis
of argument structure) (Flickinger et al. 2010). That analysis identified the ‘nearest
neighbours’ of each verb, i.e., those verbs that are distributionally (significantly) more
similar to them than others. Two predicates, e.g., ‘seem (x, Fx, y)’ and ‘think (y, Fx)’,
have a similar distribution to the extent that they co-occur in the corpus with the same
other words as arguments, and in the same proportion (!). The five nearest neigh-
bours of ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ included the three doxastic verbs ‘believe’, ‘think’, and
‘find(mental)’, while those of ‘look’ included the latter verb (and ‘think’ and ‘believe’
among the top twenty). For all three verbs, epistemic verbs (like ‘know’ or ‘realise’)
were distributionally less similar. Remarkably, the nearest neighbours identified did
not include any clearly experiential terms.
Distributionally similar expressions are used interchangeably in a variety
of prototypical contexts (after argument swapping). Across such contexts, ‘X
seems/appears/looks F to S’ are used interchangeably most often with ‘S
thinks/believes that X is F’, less often with ‘S knows that X is F’, and yet less often
with experiential terms. We can infer, first, that the intransitive use of appearance verbs
6 See relevant entries in: http://www.macmillandictionary.com/; https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/; cf.
https://wordnet.princeton.edu/wordnet/. Last accessed 20/05/2018.
7 It is an open question whether this generalised situation schema has subordinate schemas that are verb-
specific and include components suggested by Austin (1962, pp. 36–37): special circumstances, agent’s
possession of inconclusive evidence, etc.
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is more frequently employed to attribute doxastic than epistemic or experiential atti-
tudes; and, second, that its stereotypical association with different patient properties
varies: The highly salient use at issue is strongly associated with doxastic patient-
properties, less strongly with epistemic patient properties, and even more weakly with
experiential properties lexicalised by other expressions. These properties are decreas-
ingly strongly integrated in the ‘appearance schema’. Pace Austin (1962, pp. 36–37),
our ‘nearest neighbours’ analysis thus suggests that, in their dominant sense, all three
appearance verbs are stereotypically associated with doxastic patient-properties, and
more strongly with these than with others. Behavioural experiments using a forced-
choice plausibility-ranking task (cf. below, Sect. 4.1) further suggest that doxastic
patient-properties are as strongly associated with ‘look’ as with ‘appear’ and more
strongly with ‘seem’ (Fischer and Engelhardt 2016).
A less salient special sense is provided by philosophers of perception who have
explained a ‘phenomenal’ use of appearance- and perception-verbs, in which these
verbs merely serve to describe subjects’ experience, without factive, epistemic, or
doxastic implications (cf. ‘Hit on the head, he saw stars’) (Ayer 1956, p. 90; Jackson
1977, pp. 33–49; Maund 1986; cf. Chisholm 1957, pp. 44–48). For example, in the
argument from illusion (see below, Sects. 7.2–7.3), this phenomenal sense, and only
this sense, allows them to describe familiar cases of non-veridical perception (where
nobody is taken in) by saying, e.g., that a round coin appears elliptical, when viewed
sideways. The intended phenomenal interpretation is metaphorical and can be obtained
with the common feature-transfer strategy of metaphor interpretation (Bortfeld and
McGlone 2001; Ortony 1993; Searle 1993): Subject to contextual constraints, one or
more stereotypical implications of a word are chosen as its intended interpretation,
and all contextually irrelevant others suppressed (‘Achilles is a lion’—Achilles is [as]
noble and courageous [as a lion]). For verbs, this means that one or more components
of the stereotypically associated situation schema are retained for interpretation. To
interpret the phenomenal use of appearance-verbs, this strategy retains the experiental
component of the appearance schema (S looks at X, X visually looks F to S) and
interprets the utterance as stating that the agent’s experience is similar to that model
(cf. Ayer 1956, p. 96).
The three conditions identified by our Salience Bias Hypothesis hence apply when
appearance verbs are used in the phenomenal sense: (1) These verbs are high-frequency
(see MEDAL), our nearest neighbours analysis suggests (2) their doxastic use is far
more salient than all others, and we have just argued that (3) the retention strategy
is used to interpret less salient phenomenal uses. According to our hypothesis, these
uses should therefore prompt doxastic inferences (e.g., from ‘X appears F to S’ to S
thinks that X is F), even in inappropriate contexts (where the viewer does not think
that X is F).
3.3 Hypotheses




H1 Even in inappropriate contexts which invite phenomenal interpretation of the
verb, ‘X looks F [to S]’, ‘X appears F [to S]’, and ‘X seems F [to S]’ all [i] trigger
stereotypical inferences to S thinks that X is F, and [ii] their conclusions influence
further cognition (judgment and reasoning).
Inferences with the I-heuristic are at the bottom of the pragmatic pecking order and
can be defeated by conflicting inferences with other heuristics or maxims (Levinson
2000, pp. 157–158): Even when triggered, their conclusions may be swiftly suppressed
in face of conflicting inferences and fail to influence further cognition. The inferences
suggested by H1 are particularly vulnerable to defeat by inferences from the Maxim
of Manner (Grice 1989): In many contexts, speakers might have used ‘is’ instead
of appearance verbs, and hearers will infer from preference for these verbs over the
simpler and more frequent copula that it is in doubt or contention whether X is F
(Grice 1961). This would render it less likely that patients are inclined to think that
X is F. We therefore further examine the robustness of the hypothesised stereotypical
inferences in the face of competing Manner-inferences.
To develop a testable hypothesis, consider the more precise formulation of the
neo-Gricean M-heuristic (Levinson 2000, pp. 136–137):
(M-hearer) Where S uses a marked expression in saying ‘p’, and there is an unmarked
alternate expression which the speaker might have employed in the same
sentence frame, instead, infer that the situation talked about does not con-
form to the stereotype associated with the unmarked alternate expression.
Where will such inferences be triggered by appearance verbs? These verbs are
marked by comparison to ‘is’, in virtue of being less frequent and less neutral in
register (Eckman 1977; Shattuck-Hufnagel and Klatt 1979). The M-heuristic will
trigger inferences from preference of appearance verbs over ‘is’, when those verbs are
used in the same sentence-frames (‘X appears/is F’), i.e., leave the patient implicit, and
when ‘is’ is regarded as ‘alternate expression’ to appearance verbs. This will happen
only where these verbs, like ‘is’, are interpreted as predicating properties of agents.
Since they are typically used, instead, to attribute doxastic and other attitudes to patients
(Brogaard 2013, 2014), this only happens where, as in Grice’s (1961) examples, the
implicit patient is the speaker herself: Exploiting the stereotypical doxastic implication
(‘I, the speaker, am inclined to think that…’) then allows speakers to express judgments
about the appearance-verbs’ agent X, which they might have expressed more simply by
saying ‘X is F’. M-inferences from preference of appearance verbs over ‘is’ will hence
only occur in case the patient-role is re-assigned from the verb’s (implicit) patient, to
the speaker. Such a re-assignment occurs when it avoids attributing contradictions to
the speaker.
Where appearance-verbs take non-perceptual objects as agents (‘The strat-
egy appeared perfect’), contextually inappropriate experiential components of the
appearance-schema will be suppressed, and ‘X appears F’ reduces to the attribu-
tion of epistemic or doxastic attitudes to the implicit patient. Where sequels are
inconsistent with these attributions, recipients will perceive a strong clash, prompting
remedial interpretative action in the shape of patient-reassignment, which facilitates
M-inferences. By contrast, where appearance-verbs go with visual objects (‘The dress
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appeared orange’), the verb-noun combination will reinforce the experiential impli-
cations that the patient is looking at the object, and this offers a certain aspect to
her (cf. Bicknell et al. 2010). Sequels inconsistent with inferred doxastic attributions
will therefore be perceived as clashing less strongly, and less likely prompt patient-
reassignment. This reasoning motivates hypothesis
H2 Inferences with the M-heuristic defeat the posited inferences with the I-heuristic
only when appearance-verbs go with non-perceptual objects as agent-role fillers,
but not when the verbs go with visual objects (as, e.g., in arguments from illusion).
By examining psycholinguistic hypotheses H1 and H2 we seek empirical support
for the key idea the Austinian strand of critical ordinary language philosophy relies on:
the idea that even competent speakers (like philosophers) make contextually inappro-
priate stereotypical inferences that influence further judgment and reasoning. To begin
examining Austin’s further metaphilosophical hypothesis that such inferences are at
the root of some philosophical paradoxes, we will deploy psycholinguistic findings to
assess a diagnostic hypothesis about a particular example:
H3 Arguments from illusion crucially involve contextually inappropriate stereotypi-
cal inferences from phenomenal uses of appearance verbs to doxastic conclusions.
That such automatic inferences are crucially involved in these arguments means
that they afford the best available explanation of a crucial step made in the argu-
ments. This hypothesis can be followed up in two complementary ways: Analyses of
different versions of the argument (below, Sect. 7) can examine to what extent the
argument involves the step supposedly best explained by the inferences at issue—i.e.,
whether this step is indeed crucial. But further experimental work can help us assess
whether these inferences indeed best explain the step: Perhaps surprisingly, we can
bring findings from cross-linguistic investigations to bear on this issue.
Cross-linguistic investigation can help because the arguments of interest were
advanced also in languages with increasingly rigid verb-final sentence structure,
including German (reviews: Staudacher 2011; Wiesing 2002) and Japanese (Genka
2017; Nobuhara 1999). Verb-associated stereotypes affect utterance interpretation
less strongly in verb-final languages than in verb-medial languages like English:
Grammatical information and processing preferences are conventionalised differently
in typologically distinct languages (Hawkins 1994)8: If the verb comes at the end
(German, Japanese), then identification of arguments for the verb employs prior infor-
mation. By contrast, verb-medial languages (English) allow more verb processing
time, but initially leave the object undetermined (Melinger and Mauner 1999; Tanen-
haus and Carlson 1989). Therefore, information associated with the verb, including
stereotypes, has more time to affect interpretations, and may affect comprehension
more strongly, in verb-medial than verb-final languages (Masuoka 2002; Matsui 2000).
It is hence a live possibility that stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs do
not affect utterance interpretation in German and Japanese strongly enough to drive
paradoxical arguments. Since arguments from illusion still had their following in these
8 Pre-verb interpretation of nouns is facilitated by morphological case-markers (Bornkessel et al. 2004),
which are highly correlated with verb-final languages (Hawkins 2004).
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language communities, the inferences of interest would then arguably not offer the
best available explanation for any step in the argument—even in English (where they
would at best add to the persuasiveness of a step made independently). To examine
H3, we therefore followed up a study of English with studies of German and Japanese.
The stereotypical inferences we identified play a crucial role in the target arguments
only if positive findings for English are replicated in these languages.
4 Experiment 1: English
4.1 Approach and predictions
We used a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task. Participants were presented with
short (2-sentence) texts9 which differ in one critical word (‘minimal pairs’):
6a. The hill seemed quite steep. The rambler thought it was gentle.
6b. The hill was quite steep. The rambler thought it was gentle.
Participants are asked to indicate which of the two strikes them as more plausible,
even in the absence of a clear-cut preference. Critical items paired sentences using
‘look’, ‘appear’, or ‘seem’ with otherwise identical sentences which employed ‘is’
(a verb without doxastic implications). The second sentence (‘The rambler thought it
was gentle’) was inconsistent with the posited doxastic inferences from the appear-
ance verb. This conflict invites a phenomenal (re)interpretation of the verb, which
lacks doxastic implications. If, even so (by H1), participants make doxastic inferences
from that verb and retain (rather than suppress) the conclusion (here: ‘The rambler
thought the hill was quite steep’), then the conclusion’s persistent clash with the sequel
should lower plausibility of ‘seem’- etc. sentences (6a), while no such inferences will
affect plausibility of ‘is’-sentences (6b). Other things being equal (or given exclusion
of other relevant factors, see Sect. 4.2), these ‘is’-sentences will then strike partici-
pants as more plausible than counterparts with appearance verbs. By contrast, if the
posited inferences are not triggered, or are swiftly suppressed, preferences should
be random (i.e., no difference in plausibility). In view of conflicts with background
beliefs or simultaneous inferences, initial inferences can be swiftly suppressed, and
fail to influence plausibility judgments in as little as 1 s after the sentence (Fischer
and Engelhardt 2017). While it cannot assess whether inferences are first triggered
and then suppressed, the forced-choice paradigm is well suited to examining whether
inferences are triggered and influence further cognition.
Since the task requires participants to compare sentences differing in one word,
this paradigm lends itself particularly well to studying the robustness of stereotypical
inferences (with the I-heuristic) in the light of competing pragmatic inferences with
the M-heuristic. The reasoning motivating H2 has us complement items with visual
objects (like 6) with items containing non-perceptual objects:
9 In view of criticism against experimental philosophy from ‘radically contextualist’ OLP (Baz 2017), note
the context-free presentation of brief items is well suited precisely to study automatic inferences from brief
premises of philosophical arguments, presented out of any (non-theoretical) context.
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19a. The plan looked good. Cole believed it was terrible.
19b. The plan was good. Cole believed it was terrible.
If participants re-assign the implicit patient role of the first sentence from Cole to the
statement’s author, they will infer with the M-heuristic from (19a) that the quality of
the plan was in doubt. This makes it more plausible that Cole believed it was terrible,
and attenuates preferences for ‘is’-sentences (19b). H2 predicts such attenuation for
items involving non-perceptual, but not visual objects.
We thus infer from our first two hypotheses that
[Prediction 1] participants will prefer (find more plausible) ‘is’-sentences over all
alternatives, in pairs with visual objects, and
[Prediction 2] this (plausibility) preference will be attenuated, possibly to the point
of randomness, in pairs with non-perceptual objects.
H3 predicts that positive findings for English will be replicated in German and
Japanese.
By inviting comparisons and providing salient triggers for the M-heuristic, our task
seems to provide the strongest possible invitation to make defeating M-inferences.
Any such inferences picked up (through decreased preference for ‘is’-sentences) may
therefore be task artefacts. But, by the same token, significant preferences for ‘is’-
sentences will provide strong evidence that the stereotypical (I-heuristic) inferences
of interest are not defeated by competition (M-heuristic inferences), in the contexts of
interest (arguments from illusion).
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Seventy-three undergraduate psychology students from the University of East Anglia
participated for course credit. All were native speakers of English. Four were bilingual.
4.2.2 Materials
Participants received a pen-and-paper questionnaire with 120 items, and were asked to
indicate which of each pair ‘strikes you as more plausible’. The questionnaire contained
36 critical items, 12 for each pairing ‘look’/‘is’, ‘appear’/‘is’, and ‘seem’/‘is’. For each
pairing, half of the items had visual objects, and half had non-perceptual objects. Items
with visual objects attributed to them colour, shape, and size (one each per verb) or
more complex visually ascertainable properties, e.g., ‘Tom’s shoes appeared/were
dirty. Tom believed they were clean.’ Items were controlled for verb-order: In items
with visual and non-perceptual objects, respectively, each critical verb appeared in
sentence (a) precisely half the time. Cancellation sentences employed ‘believed’ or
‘thought’, in equal number.
When participants cannot base plausibility assessments on factual knowledge (as
in uninformative items, e.g., about fictitious people and their shoes), participants base
them on metacognitive cues, in particular on the level of fluency or subjective ease they
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experience in processing the sentence(s) (review: Alter and Oppenheimer 2009). We
predicted differences in plausibility due to the presence versus absence of stereotypical
inferences to conclusions inconsistent with the sequel: Where incongruence engen-
ders difficulty or ‘dysfluency’, it leads to lower (subjective) plausibility. While most
factors that influence fluency, including familiarity and pronounceability of individual
words (Oppenheimer 2006), syntactic complexity of the sentence (Lowrey 1989), and
priming by earlier words, are controlled by using minimal pairs or exclusion norming
(below), we cannot eliminate differences in frequency and hence familiarity between
appearance verbs and ‘is’ (Supplementary Appendix, Section A).
To examine the extent in which participants’ plausibility rankings are influenced
by word frequency, we constructed 30 minimal pairs whose critical verbs differed
in frequency. Each of the 15 verbs occurred once in a ‘frequency-congruent’ item
where the text employing the more frequent verb was also more consistent with its
associated stereotype, and once in a ‘frequency-reversed’ item, where word-frequency
and stereotype-consistency work in opposite directions. E.g., the more frequent verb
‘obey’ stereotypically implies submission to formal authority:
[frequency-congruent]
80a/b. The colonel told the captain not to change his company’s position until
further notice. The captain thought this reckless but obeyed/complied.
[frequency-reversed]
18a/b. Jane asked the campers on her land to move somewhere else by tomorrow
afternoon. They weren’t happy but complied/obeyed.
If participants make judgments predominantly in line with stereotype-consistency,
and do not make fewer such judgments about frequency-reversed than frequency-
congruent items, their plausibility judgments are unlikely to be influenced by
frequency.
4.2.3 Procedure and design
In constructing frequency-congruent and -reversed fillers, we used a written British
English corpus (Leech et al. 2001), appropriate for our participants.
In a prior norming study, four philosophy graduate students responded to a draft
questionnaire and then explained their responses with the first reasons coming to
mind, first independently on paper, then in group discussion. To exclude the influence
of associative priming, which makes sentences ‘sound better’ or ‘more idiomatic’, we
discharged or modified critical items where even one participant mentioned that one
formulation ‘sounded better’ or ‘more idiomatic’ than the other. To exclude extrane-
ous content-based considerations, we also changed items where even one participant
offered such considerations. As frequency-congruent and -reversed filler items, we
only kept items where at least two participants independently invoked the same stereo-
typical association of the critical verb, all agreed in subsequent discussion that the verb
had these ‘connotations’ or ‘associations’, and no other association was mentioned by
more than one student.
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In the actual study, participants were instructed to ‘read each text carefully and then
respond as quickly as you can’, to ensure responses in under 5 s, before controlled
processes could modify automatic cognition (De Neys 2006). Brief discussion of three
practice items ensured understanding of the procedure. To prevent fatigue, participants
were instructed to take a 5 min break half way (remaining seated, no phones).
We manipulated verb (look/appear/seem) and object (visual/non-perceptual) within
subject, in a 3×2 design, and measured consistency of preference, which admits
parametric tests. Predicted responses were coded as ‘1’, ‘incorrect’ responses as ‘0’.
Data were screened for outliers prior to analysis, but there were no datapoints greater
than 3 SDs from the mean in any condition.
4.3 Results
For the reader’s convienience, results for all languages (Experiments 1–3) are presented
together, in Tables 1 and 2.10 To preview results, both predictions were confirmed,
for all languages: As per Prediction 1, participants had a significant preference for
‘is’-sentences with visual objects over counterparts using any appearance verb. As
per Prediction 2, preferences were attenuated for ‘is’-sentences with non-perceptual
objects, in many conditions to the point of randomness. Given the binary choice, pref-
erences are random when ‘is’-sentences are deemed more plausible than counterparts
half the time. Whether preferences were significant or random was determined with
one-sample t-tests with a test-value of .5.
For English, a 3×2 (verb×object) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no signif-
icant interaction (p > .50), but showed a significant main effect of verb F(2,144) 
14.05, p < .001, η2  .16 and object F(1,72)  8.40, p  .005, η2  .10. That is: Which
appearance-verb was used made a difference for participants’ plausibility preferences,
and whether sentences had a visual or non-perceptual object also affected preferences.
Preferences concerning ‘look’-items (mean across objects .59) and ‘appear’-items
(mean across objects .59) were not significantly different from each other (p > .69),
but ‘is’ preferences were significantly stronger for them than for ‘seem’-items (mean
across objects .51) (‘look’ vs ‘seem’ t(72)  4.43, p < .001; ‘appear’ vs ‘seem’ t(72)
 4.94, p < .001). The significant effect of object was based on higher preferences
for ‘is’-sentences with visual objects than with non-perceptual objects (means across
verbs .64 vs .48). In the absence of a significant interaction, there is no statistical
support for more detailed comparisons. As predicted, however, ‘is’-preferences were
significant for items with all three appearance-verbs and visual objects, and attenuated
to randomness, or even reversed, for items with non-perceptual objects (Table 1).11
10 To assess whether there were significant differences within the full dataset, we conducted an omnibus
analysis which included language as a variable. This analysis helps guard against family-wise Type I error,
and reveals whether some conditions differ significantly from each other. A 3×3×2 (language×verb×
object) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of verb F(2,414)  10.51, p < .001,
η2  .05, object F(1,207)  22.36, p < .001, η2  .10, and language F(2,207)  6.73, p  .001, η2  .06.
The 3-way interaction was also significant F(4,414)  2.41, p  .049, η2  .02.
11 In view of forceful arguments that correction for multiple comparisons is too conservative (e.g., Arm-
strong 2014; Cabin and Mitchell 2000; Nakagawa 2004), we used the conventional significance threshold
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Table 1 Means (SDs) for verb and object broken down by language
Visual Non-visual
Look Appear Seem Look Appear Seem
English .68 (.28)*** .66 (.30)*** .59 (.27)** .49 (.28) .52 (.30) .43 (.29)*
German .73 (.28)*** .78 (.25)*** .69 (.28)*** .65 (.31)*** .67 (.29)*** .57 (.30)
Japanese .57 (.28)* .58 (.31)* .66 (.27)*** .56 (.30) .56 (.27)* .51 (.29)
Significant one-sample t tests (test value .5) are indicated (*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001)
Table 2 Means (SDs) for verb and object broken down by language, after exlusion of potentially frequency-
sensitive responders
Visual Non-visual
Look Appear Seem Look Appear Seem
English .72 (.23)*** .69 (.27)*** .63 (.26)** .46 (.24) .55 (.29) .44 (.28)
German .74 (.27)*** .77 (.28)*** .69 (.30)** .59 (.34) .68 (.31)** .57 (.32)
Japanese .59 (.28)* .60 (.31)* .68 (.26)*** .59 (.29)* .58 (.27)* .55 (.27)
English (N  44), German (N  35), Japanese (N  64). Significant one-sample t-tests (test value of .5)
are indicated (*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001)
To examine the potential influence of word frequency, we used responses to filler
items to identify participants whose responses might be influenced by frequency: those
who give ‘correct’ (stereotype-consistent) responses more frequently for frequency-
congruent than for frequency-reversed fillers (where frequency and stereotypes work
in opposite directions). We derived relevant criteria empirically, by considering mean-
ingful gaps in the distribution of responses (Supplementary Appendix, Section B).
In this experiment, we defined ‘potentially frequency-sensitive responders’ as those
who responded ‘correctly’ to over 70% of frequency-congruent fillers but to under
70% of frequency-reversed items. 29 participants met this criterion and were excluded
from further analysis. Results for the 44 remaining ‘frequency-insensitive’ participants
showed the same pattern as those for the overall sample: We observed no significant
interaction (F(2,86)  2.59, p  .08, η2  .06), but main effects of object (F(1,43)
 9.15, p  .004, η2  .18) and verb (F(2,86)  8.47, p < .001, η2  .17), and simi-
lar paired comparisons (look  appear; look > seem; appear > seem) (appear vs. look:
t(43)  1.10, p  .28; appear vs. seem: t(43)  3.91, p < .001; look vs. seem: t(43) 
3.03, p  .004). ‘Is’-preferences remained significant for items with all appearance-
verbs and visual objects (Table 2). This excludes word-frequency as a counfound, and
allows us to interpret results as indicative of the hypothesised stereotypical inferences
from appearance-verbs.
Footnote 11 continued




5 Experiment 2: German
To identify the relevant German verbs, we consulted translations of English philo-
sophical texts discussing the argument from illusion, and two major German-English
dictionaries. Austin (1975, transl. of 1962) translates ‘look’ as ‘aussehen’, ‘appear’
as ‘erscheinen’, and ‘seem’ as ‘(zu sein) scheinen’, as does Staudacher (2011, p. 74,
Fn.85). In translating from Ayer (1940), Wiesing (2002, p. 3) renders ‘look’ as either
‘aussehen’ or ‘erscheinen’, ‘appear’ as either ‘erscheinen’ or ‘scheinen’, and ‘seem’
as ‘scheinen’ or ‘zu sein scheinen’, while Russell (1967, transl. of 1912) uses both
‘aussehen’ and ‘erscheinen’ for ‘look’, and ‘erscheinen’ for both ‘appear’ and ‘seem’.
The Duden-Oxford (Scholze-Stubenrecht and Sykes 1999) translates relevant senses
of ‘look’ (sense indicator: appear) as ‘aussehen’, and ‘appear’ (sense indicator: seem)
and ‘seem’ (sense indicator: appear) as ‘(zu sein) scheinen’. The Great Muret-Sanders
(Springer 2000) concurs and adds the more explicitly doxastic ‘den Anschein haben’
and ‘den Eindruck erwecken’ for ‘appear’ (sense 3), as well as ‘anscheinend sein’ and
‘erscheinen’ for ‘seem’ (sense 1). We therefore examined ‘aussehen’, ‘erscheinen’,
and ‘(zu sein) scheinen’, using the same approach as for English.
5.1 Methods
5.1.1 Participants
48 undergraduate philosophy students from the University of Cologne participated
without remuneration. All were native speakers of German.
5.1.2 Materials
Participants received a pen-and-paper questionnaire with 66 items, and the same
instructions as in English. The questionnaire contained translations of the 36 critical
items, translating ‘look’ with ‘aussehen’, ‘appear’ with ‘erscheinen’, and ‘seem’ with
‘scheinen (zu sein)’. Half of the 30 fillers were ‘frequency-congruent’, the other half
were ‘frequency-reversed’ items with the same verb (see Sect. 4.2.2). Critical items
were slightly modified in translation, where this was necessary to retain idiomatic-
ity. This included using an infinitive (‘scheint …. zu sein’) for half of visual and
non-perceptual ‘seems’ items. All other critical items used an adjectival complement.
Cancellation phrases employed ‘dachte’ (‘thought’) or ‘glaubte’ (‘believed’). Items
were controlled for verb-order.
5.1.3 Procedure and design
In constructing frequency-congruent and -reversed filler items, we used word-
frequency information from the Leipzig University Wortschatz.12 A prior norming




study with 4 participants followed the same protocol as Experiment 1, as did the main
study (except that no break was required). Design and coding were the same as before.
5.2 Results
A 3×2 (verb×object) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant interaction
(p > .70) but showed significant main effects of verb (F(2,94)  8.53, p < .001, η2
 .15) and object (F(1,47)  14.46, p < .001, η2  .24. The main effect of verb
was due to ‘is’-preferences concerning ‘look’-items (mean across objects .69) and
‘appear’-items (mean .73) being higher than for ‘seem’-items (mean .63). Preferences
concerning ‘look’ and ‘appear’ did not differ significantly (t(47)  1.74, p  .088), but
were significantly stronger for them than for ‘seem’ (‘look’ vs. ‘seem’ t(47)  2.29,
p  .026; ‘appear’ vs. ‘seem’ t(47)  4.28, p < .001). The main effect of object was
due to significantly higher ‘is’-preferences for items with visual objects (mean across
verbs .74) than with non-perceptual objects (mean .63) (t(47)  3.80, p < .001). As
predicted, ‘is’-preferences were significant for items with all appearance-verbs and
visual objects, and attenuated with non-perceptual objects, to the point of randomness
for ‘seem’ (Table 1).
We again used gaps in the distribution of data to derive a criterion to identify
potentially frequency-sensitive responders. In this study, participants qualified when
responding ‘correctly’ to over 90% of frequency-congruent fillers but to under 90% of
frequency-reversed items. 13 participants met this criterion and were excluded from
further analysis. Results for the 35 remaining particiants showed the same pattern as
the overall sample: We observed no interaction (F(2,68)  .63, p  .537, η2  .02) but
main effects of object (F(1,34)  12.15, p  .001, η2  .26) and verb (F(2,68)  5.47,
p  .006, η2  .14). However, ‘is’-preferences were now marginally lower concerning
‘look’-items (mean across objects .67) than ‘appear’-items (mean .72) (t(34)  1.90,
p  .066), and no longer significantly higher than for ‘seem’-items (mean .63) (t(34)
 1.37, p  .179), while ‘is’-preferences were still significantly higher concerning
‘appear’-items than ‘seem’-items (t(34)  3.31, p  .002); ‘is’-preferences remained
significant for all items with visual objects (Table 2). Again, this excluded frequency
as a confound.
Half the German ‘seem’-items (with visual and non-perceptual objects), employed
an infinitival construction, which should strengthen the doxastic implications. We
therefore predicted stronger ‘is’-preferences for infinitival than adjectival items with
visual objects, and expected stronger interference of the M-heuristic in items with non-
perceptual objects, resulting in a more pronounced difference between ‘is’-preferences
concerning visual and non-perceptual objects for infinitival than for adjectival ‘seem’-
items. A 2 (infinitive vs. adjective)×2 (visual vs. non-perceputal object) repeated
measures ANOVA revealed a (marginal) interaction (F(1,47)  3.97, p  .052, η2
 .08) and a main effect of object (F(1,47)  8.00, p  .007, η2  .15), allowing
us to make the relevant comparisons. We indeed observed that ‘is’-preferences for
adjectival items with visual objects were marginally lower than for infinitival items
with such objects (t(47)  − 1.80, p  .078), and that ‘is’-preferences for infini-
tival items with non-perceptual objects were significantly lower than for infinitival
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items with visual objects (t(47)  − 3.47, p  .001), while there was no significant
difference for the corresponding adjectival items (t(47)  − .82, p  .419). Cru-
cially, while ‘is’-preferences concerning infinitival items with visual objects (mean
.75) were very pronounced (t(47)  5.06, p  .000), preferences concerning their
adjectival counterparts (mean .66) remained significant (t(47)  3.59, p  .001). The
posited inferences are therefore not due to the infinitival construction, which merely
reinforces them.
6 Experiment 3: Japanese
To identify the relevant verbs in Japanese, we consulted Japanese translations of philo-
sophical texts discussing arguments from illusion (Austin 1984, transl. of 1962; Ayer
1991, transl. of 1940; Ayer 1981, transl. of 1956; Russell 1964, 1965, 2005, three
transl. of 1912). We adopted the only consistent translation schema extant, provided
by Austin (1984), which renders ‘seem’ as ‘omowareru’, and ‘look’ and ‘appear’ as
‘mieru’, using the Kanji and the hiragana character ‘mi’, respectively.13 ‘Omowareru’
is a derivative of the polysemous but clearly doxastic verb ‘omou’.14 Standard dic-
tionaries explain ‘omowareru’ in the relevant syntactic constructions as ‘something
gives some impression’ (Minamide and Nakamura 2011, p. 268) and suggest ‘look’,
‘appear’, and ‘seem’ as translations. ‘Mieru’ with kanji and hiragana ‘mi’ are largely
interchangeable derivatives of the visual verb ‘miru’.15 Standard dictionaries explain
their meaning with the relevant syntactic constructions as ‘some impression is given’
or ‘something is interpreted/supposed as such and such’, and again suggest ‘look’,
‘appear’, and ‘seem’ as translations (Minamide and Nakamura 2011, p. 1720; Watan-
abe et al. 2003, p. 2486). The two versions of ‘mieru’ differ in that Kanji symbols
convey meanings and sounds, whereas hiragana only represent sounds. Given pro-
cessing differences between these scripts (Goryo 1987; Sasanuma 1980), the Kanji
character ‘mi’, connoting (literal or metaphorical) vision, may suggest more strongly
that visual perception is involved.
Whereas the German verbs of interest preceded their complements, the Japanese
verbs appeared in sentence-final position, behind their complement, as in the transla-
tion of ‘The coin looks (seems) elliptical’:
Coin/wa/daen/ni/mieru (omowareru).
The coin/[topic-marker]/elliptical/[case forming particle]/looks (seems).
13 Ayer (1991) employs the same translations, but uses both spellings of ‘mieru’, in translating ‘appear’.
The different translations of Russell (1912) render both ‘look’ and ‘seem’ as ‘mieru’ with Kanji ‘mi’, but
‘appear’ variously as ‘mieru’ with Kanji or hiragana, ‘omowareru’, ‘arawareru’, and ‘arawareteiru’. The
last two are idiomatic only where ‘appear’ applies in the sense ‘become visible’, despite sharing kanji with
the noun for ‘appearance’ (possibly motivating this problematic translation), and we disregarded them. Ayer
(1981) also translates ‘look’ as ‘yôsu wo shiteiru’, but this is mainly used to express hedged judgments and
has strong doxastic implications.
14
‘think’, ‘intend’, ‘judge’, ‘evaluate’, ‘imagine’, ‘assume’, ‘expect’, ‘pray’, ‘desire’ ‘believe’, ‘suspect’
and ‘recall’ (Watanabe et al. 2003, pp. 426–428). See also http://jisho.org/.
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89 undergraduate humanities and social science students from Musashino University,
Tokyo, participated without remuneration. All were native speakers of Japanese.
6.1.2 Materials
Participants received a pen-and-paper questionnaire with 66 items, and the same
instructions as in the previous study. 12 (‘look’) items employed the verb ‘mieru’
with Kanji ‘mi’; 12 (‘appear’) items used ‘mieru’ with hiragana ‘mi’; and 12 (‘seem’)
items employed ‘omowareru’. 19 critical items employed the construction with ‘ni’;
9 used the auxiliary verb ‘yôni’. Cancellation sentences used the verbs ‘kangaeta’ (
thought) or ‘omowareta’ ( believed) in equal number. The grammatical subject of
the cancellation sentences was accompanied by the topic-marker ‘wa’, which does
not determine by itself whether the agent of the second sentence is identical with the
implicit patient from the first. 30 fillers were constructed as before. As in Exp. 1–2,
items were controlled for word-order.
6.1.3 Procedure and design
In constructing frequency-congruent and -reversed filler items, we used word-
frequency information from NINJAL-LWP for BCCWJNational.16 A prior norming
study with 6 participants followed the same protocol as English and German studies.
The protocol, design and coding were as before.
6.2 Results
A 3×2 (verb×object) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant interaction
(F(2,176)  8.62, p < .001, η2  .09) and a significant main effect of object (F(1,88)
 9.41, p  .003, η2  .10), though not of verb (p > .40). The significant interaction
permits more fine-grained comparisons. We first considered ‘is’-preferences for items
with visual vs. non-perceptual objects, for each type of verb. ‘Is’-preferences were
significantly higher concerning items with visual objects for ‘seem’-items (means .66
vs. .51; t(88)  − 5.54, p < .001), but not for ‘look’- and ‘appear’-items (p’s > .60).
We then compared preferences for items with visual objects and different verbs. ‘Is’-
preferences were similar for ‘look’- and ‘appear’-items (t(88)  − .39, p  .701), and
significantly higher for ‘seems’ (look vs. seem t(88)  − 3.24, p  .002; appear vs.
seem t(88) − 3.24, p  .002). For items with non-perceptual objects, ‘is’-preferences
were similar for ‘look’- and ‘appear’-items (both means .56), but numerically lower for
‘seem’-items, though only the diffence between ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ was statistically
(marginally) significant (t(88)  1.97, p  .052). As predicted, ‘is’-preferences were
16 http://nlb.ninjal.ac.jp/, using The Balanced Corpus of Contemporary Written Japanese.
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significant for items with all appearance-verbs and visual objects, while attenuation
with non-perceptual objects was only observed with ‘seem’ (Table 1).
We identified potentially frequency-sensitive responders in the same way as in the
German study (Exp.2). Results for the remaining 64 clearly frequency-insensitive
responders (Table 2) showed exactly the same pattern as those for the overall sample:
We observed a significant interaction (F(2,126)  4.67, p  .02, η2  .07) and main
effect of object (F(1,63)  4.38, p  .04, η2  .07), but not of verb (p  .46). The
paired comparisons were similar (seem-visual vs. seem-nonvisual t(63)  − 3.78,
p < .001; look-visual vs. seem-visual t(63)  − 2.53, p  .014; appear-visual vs.




Our three cross-linguistic experiments (English, German, Japanese) followed up the
Salience Bias Hypothesis (SBH): When frequently used polysemous words have a
clearly dominant sense or use whose associated schema is deployed in interpreting
less salient uses, the latter uses will prompt inferences licensed (only) by the dominant
sense, also in inappropriate contexts. Our experiments examined, in the first instance,
two hypotheses about such inferences from appearance verbs, and their robustness:
(H1) ‘X looks F’, ‘X appears F’, and ‘X seems F’ [to S] as well as German and Japanese
equivalents all prompt stereotypical inferences (with the I-heuristic) to S thinks that
X is F, whose conclusions frequently influence further cognition (judgment and rea-
soning), even in inappropriate contexts which invite a phenomenal interpretation of
the verb. (H2) Even where sequels are inconsistent with them, such doxastic infer-
ences from appearance verbs are defeated by competing pragmatic inferences (with
the M-heuristic) only when these verbs are paired with non-perceptual objects, but
not when they go with visual objects. In the plausibility-ranking paradigm we used,
these hypotheses translated into predictions about (plausibility) preferences for ‘is’-
sentences over counterparts using appearance-verbs. These predictions were borne
out, for all three languages.
As per Prediction 1, we observed significant preferences for ‘is’-sentences in items
with visual objects, with all appearance verbs. This suggests that hypothesised dox-
astic inferences are made and influence further cognitive processing, when sentences
combine appearance-verbs with visual objects as agent-role fillers. As per Prediction
2, we observed that preferences for ‘is’-sentences were lower with non-perceptual
objects than with visual objects: We measured a significant main effect of object,
across verbs, in all three languages.17 In English and German, ‘is’-preferences were
numerically lower with non-perceptual objects for all three verbs. In English, they
17 We measured medium-size effects in German. In English and Japanese, effects were comparatively
small, as often in social science experiments (Rosnow and Rosenthal 2003); but they were well above the
anchor point of η2  .04 for practical significance (Ferguson 2009). Further relevant sources of variance
(individual differences in verbal IQ, inhibitory abilities, etc.) are unfortunately ill understood at this point.
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became random, for all three verbs, upon exclusion of potentially frequency-sensitive
responders; in German, they remained significant only for ‘appear’. In Japanese, ‘is’-
preferences were significantly lower (attenuated to randomness) for ‘seems’-items
with non-perceptual than with visual objects, though the object-manipulation made
no difference for preferences concerning ‘mieru’-items. The observed attenuation of
‘is’-preferences provides evidence that doxastic inferences with the I-heuristic were
frequently countermanded by inferences with the M-heuristic, which were probed by
our task.
These findings provide additional experimental support for the Salience Bias
Hypothesis: They complement prior findings about perception verbs (Fischer and
Engelhardt 2017, 2019, under review) with fresh findings about appearance verbs.
Second, these findings reveal the robustness of the inappropriate stereotypical infer-
ences posited by the SBH: Our experimental task and design created the most
favourable conditions for defeating stereotypical inferences with the M-heuristic.
Even so, such defeat occurred only where appearance verbs took non-perceptual
objects as agent-role fillers, while doxastic inferences with the I-heuristic went through
undefeated where the verbs took visual objects (pace Grice 1961). Third, cross-
linguistic replication for increasingly rigid verb-final languages (German, Japanese),
where verb-associated stereotypes influence utterance interpretation less strongly
than in verb-medial English, suggests that inappropriate but influential stereotypi-
cal inferences are not only triggered by words which play a pivotal role in utterance
interpretation, but more generally.
Finally, we found that ‘look’ and ‘appear’ behaved the same in all languages while
‘seem’ behaved differently. This is least surprising in Japanese, where we were merely
dealing with different spellings of the same verb ‘mieru’. But it seems inconsistent with
Austin’s (1962, pp. 36–37) hypothesis that ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ are more closely tied
to judgment and belief than ‘looks’ (which supposedly is typically used to comment
on the mere look of things): Not ‘look’, but ‘seem’, is the odd one out in terms of
doxastic inferences.18 That even the ordinary language philosopher credited with the
most extraordinary ‘genius for spotting linguistic differences and distinctions’ (Searle
2001, p. 226; cf. Cavell 1994, p. 21; Williams 2014, p. 44) misperceived the relevant
linguistic pattern, forcefully illustrates how useful it is to complement informal with
formal experiments.
By supporting the SBH, our findings support the psycholinguistic assumption
underwriting Austin’s brand of critical ordinary language philosophy: Under certain
conditions, even competent speakers make contextually inappropriate stereotypical
inferences that go through undefeated and influence further judgment and reasoning.
The SBH identifies a first relevant set of conditions. We now turn to the metaphilo-
sophical hypothesis the Austinian approach seeks to make good: Such inappropriate
inferences are at the root of some philosophical paradoxes and problems. Austin (1962)
examines one such paradox, the ‘argument from illusion’. We will now follow up the
18 Since stereotypical association with doxastic patient-properties is stronger for ‘seem’ than ‘look’ or
‘appear’ (Fischer and Engelhardt 2016), we submit our ‘seem’-items are perceived as more contradictory.
In our deliberately artificial forced-choice setting (Sect. 4.1), this prompts occasional reference reassignment
and M-heuristic inferences (Sect. 3.3), even with visual objects, and thus leads to the lower ‘is’-preferences
observed in this study (Exp.1, replicated for German in Exp.2).
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metaphilosophical hypothesis by exploring to what extent our word-specific hypothe-
ses (H1) and (H2) help develop the specific diagnostic hypothesis that has already
received some preliminary support from the replication of English results in verb-
final German and Japanese (see end Sect. 3.3):
H3 The ‘argument from illusion’ relies on contextually inappropriate stereotypical
inferences from phenomenal uses of appearance verbs (in the argument’s initial
premises) to doxastic conclusions.19
The development of H3 will illustrate, more generally, how experimental investi-
gations into automatic cognitive processes can support the analysis of philosophical
arguments and, specifically, ‘diagnostic’ analyses that seek to expose fallacies. The
more blatant the identified fallacies are, once spelled out, the more strongly the pro-
posed analysis violates hermeneutic principles of charity (Adler 1994; Lewinski 2012),
and the more strongly it is in need of empirical validation (Thagard and Nisbett 1983).
Such validation is provided by psychological explanations of when and why compe-
tent thinkers should commit the fallacies at issue (see above, Sect. 3). In line with
general trends in cognitive science (reviews: Kahneman 2011; Wilson 2002), exper-
imental philosophy has begun to examine how philosophical thought is shaped by
largely unconscious automatic processes into which only experiments give us insight
(see above, Sect. 1). Where an automatic inference process leads from an explicit
premise to a conclusion that remains implicit but provides input for another cognitive
process that generates an explicit conclusion, a thinker may leap from explicit premise
to explicit conclusion, without awareness of the initial inference and the intermedi-
ate conclusion. If that initial automatic inference is inappropriate, the fallacy will be
committed below the radar of the thinker’s conscious awareness.
We will now develop (H3) in conjunction with the suggestion that this happens in
the argument from illusion: that the automatic comprehension inferences explained
by the SBH and documented by our experiments provide input for a well-researched
judgment heuristic that delivers an explicit verdict, without thinkers being aware of
the initial inappropriate inference or its implicit conclusion (Sect. 7.2). Then we will
explore to what extent (H3) can contribute to resolving the paradox (Sect. 7.3), and
clarify the sense in which it might help ‘dissolve’ a philosophical problem (Sect. 7.4).
We thus contribute towards first proof of concept for an experimental implementa-
tion of Austin’s critical project that may provide fresh inspiration for restrictionist
experimental philosophy (cf. Sect. 1).
7.2 Reanalysing the argument from illusion
The commonsense conception of sense-perception as experiential awareness mainly
of material objects has been challenged by arguments that proceed from two kinds of
cases: (1) from mostly familiar cases of non-veridical perception (‘illusions’) where
physical objects look or otherwise appear to have a shape, size, colour, or other prop-
erty they do not actually possess, and (2) from often fictitious cases of ‘hallucination’,
19 Austin (1962) discusses appearance verbs (see above, Sect. 2), but does not deploy conclusions to analyse
the argument from illusion. H3 was first mooted by Fischer (2014a).
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where someone has an experience as of perceiving a physical object though no suit-
able object is actually around. These arguments lead to the same conclusion and the
label ‘argument from illusion’ has sometimes been loosely applied to both. Despite
occasional assimilation (e.g., Ayer 1940, p. 3; Fish 2010, pp. 12–13), however, these
arguments are now generally treated as distinct (Crane and French 2015, Smith 2002).
We here consider ‘arguments from illusion’ in the now common stricter sense, which
proceed from cases of the first kind.20 E.g.:
1. When a subject looks at a round coin sideways, the coin appears elliptical to her.
Seminal statements of the argument (e.g., Hume [1748] 1739, p. 152) infer directly
that, in these cases, an ‘image’ (aka ‘sense-datum’) rather than a physical object
must be ‘present to the mind’. Subsequent proponents of the argument then sought to
make explicit, and rationalize, the implicit reasoning driving this (to them) intuitively
compelling leap of thought. Austin addresses early 20th century statements (e.g., Ayer
1940, p. 4; Broad 1923, p. 240; Price 1932, pp. 27–30; Russell 1912, pp. 1–3), which
break this decisive ‘sense-datum inference’ (Smith 2002, p. 25) up into two parts.
From (1) they infer the ‘negative conclusion’:
2. When a subject looks at a round coin sideways, she is not (directly) aware of the
round coin.
The positive conclusion that subjects are, instead, aware of an ‘elliptical sense-datum’
is then obtained from an uncontroversial response to (2):
3. When a subject look at a round coin sideways, she is (directly) aware of something.
4. By (2) & (3), the subject is then (directly) aware of something other than the round
coin (namely, a ‘sense-datum’).
The sense-datum is then credited with the shape, size, and colour that the coin
merely looks (there and then). This yields so-called ‘phenomenal judgments’, such as
‘The object that viewers are then (directly) aware of is elliptical.’ The remainder of
the argument then generalises from (4) to argue that in all cases of visual perception,
we are (directly) aware of sense-data.
This early 20th century version has been superseded by other versions of the argu-
ment, in current debates (Robinson 2001, pp. 57–58; Smith 2002, pp. 25–27; cf. Crane
and French 2015; Fish 2010, pp. 12–13). However, analysis of the currently most
prominent version (in Sect. 7.3) will benefit from prior analysis of its predecessor. We
therefore now reconstruct how contextually inappropriate inferences may drive the
crucial inference from (1) to (2) above. To do so, we turn from explicit reasoning to
automatic inferences that remain implicit. Proponents of the argument divided their
‘sense-datum inference’ into a negative step (from 1 to 2) and a positive step (via 3
to 4). We divide the negative step, in turn, into two automatic inferences governed
by well-researched heuristics: We suggest that comprehension inferences with the
I-heuristic provide input for judgments with the representativeness heuristic.
Statements of arguments from illusion occasionally use the appearance verb ‘look’
(e.g., Ayer 1940, p. 4) but mainly ‘appear’ (e.g., Ayer 1940, p. 3; Fish 2010, pp. 12–13;




Robinson 2001, p. 57; Russell 1912, p. 2; Smith 2002, p. 25) and ‘seem’ (e.g., Ayer
1940, p. 3; Broad 1923, pp. 239–240; Crane and French 2015, p. 3; Moore 1918/19,
pp. 21–23; Russell 1912, p. 2).21 These verbs are used here in a phenomenal sense
devoid of factive, epistemic, or even doxastic implications (see above, Sect. 3.2). The
Salience Bias Hypothesis explains why such uses trigger contextually inappropriate
doxastic inferences and our experiments show such inferences are made and go through
in uninformative contexts. Such inferences with the I-heuristic lead from the initial
premise (1) to the implicit conclusion:
(C) The viewer thinks that the object viewed is elliptical.
Since the appearance verb goes with perceptual objects in all relevant premises, this
inference will not be defeated by inferences with the competing M-heuristic from the
same verb (Sect. 7.1).
But will the inference get defeated by conflicting inferences from other words fig-
uring in statements of arguments from illusion? We identified two conditions under
which the inferences of interest are particularly likely to go through undefeated (see
end Sect. 3.1). Both are satisfied by statements of arguments from illusion: (a) Some
statements provide poor context, and the case description triggers no further compre-
hension inferences with a bearing on the truth of doxastic conclusions, as in ‘When
partially immersed in water, the straight stick looks bent’ (Ayer 1940, p. 3). Hence
the doxastic conclusions are not suppressed. (b) Other statements do trigger incom-
patible inferences, but these are supported by weaker stereotypical associations. E.g.,
‘When subjects look at a round coin sideways…’, will trigger stereotypical inferences
to ‘The viewer knows there is a round coin’. But ‘S looks at an F’ is less strongly
associated with epistemic or doxastic agent properties than appearance verbs are asso-
ciated with doxastic patient-properties.22 Hence the weak competition gets sidelined
by the stronger inferences (Foss and Speer 1991; Morris 1994), whose conclusion
(C) goes through. Either way, doxastic inferences provide input for further cognitive
processing.
Arguments from illusion are commonly presented as addressing the guiding ques-
tion whether perceivers are aware of physical objects. The present input is hence
processed in addressing the task of judging whether or not the viewer is aware of
the physical object (the round coin). Such categorization tasks are addressed with a
version of the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Tversky
and Kahneman 1982; cf. Morewedge and Kahneman 2010). This heuristic has us base
(probabilised) categorisation judgments (how probable is it that the ordered pair of
21 An anonymous reviewer questioned whether the use of appearance verbs is crucial for the argument.
Brief ‘roadmaps’ of the argument (e.g., the first outline in Crane and French 2015, Sect. 2.1) indeed do
without them, but start the argument with the controversial negative claim (2 above). Appearance verbs are
required, however, for stating the uncontroversial case descriptions (like 1 above) that fuller statements of
the argument treat as initial premise.
22 A nearest neighbours analysis provided supporting evidence. Aurélie Herbelot complemented the data
from Fischer et al. (2015) (see above, Sect. 3.2) with similar analysis for ‘look at’. While its five nearest
neighbours included epistemic terms ‘notice’ and ‘find’, distributional similarity was strikingly low, with
a cosine of 0.14 for the nearest neighbour and no words clearly standing out in terms of distributional
similarity. By constrast, appearance verbs had distributionally highly similar nearest neigbours (cosine 0.45
for 5th-nearest neighbour of ‘seem’ and ‘appear’), which clearly stood out.
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viewer and round coin falls under the category ‘S is aware of X’?) on the degree of
conformity with the relevant stereotype. To gauge what judgment this heuristic would
deliver in the present situation, we need to determine the components of this stereotype
and their relative weights.
An eye-tracking study revealed extensive similarities in intricate processing patterns
for ‘aware’- and ‘see’-sentences which strongly suggest similar schemas are deployed
in interpreting them (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019) with the retention strategy (see
above, Sect. 3.1). We infer that ‘S is aware of X’ is associated with a variant of the
seeing stereotype. As components, this situation schema includes epistemic agent
features (S knows what X is, S knows X is there, etc.) in addition to non-epistemic
agent and patient features (S looks at X, X is before S, X is near S, etc.).
Further data suggests that, while the stereotypes associated with ‘aware of’ and
‘see’ are similar in terms of the features they include, these features differ in their
‘weight’ or strength of association with the different verbs: ‘S is aware of X’ is mostly
applied where S does not see, hear, or feel (etc.) X: In a random sample of 1000
‘aware of’ sentences from the British National Corpus, 77% of occurrences fell into
this category (Fischer et al., in prep). In these cases, knowledge is the only agent
feature attributed to S, and the other features of the seeing-stereotype are contextually
irrelevant. We infer that epistemic agent features are more strongly associated with
‘aware’ than ‘see’, and the other features less strongly. A forced-choice plausibility
ranking experiment (reported in Supplementary Appendix, Section C, to the present
paper) confirmed that epistemic agent features are yet more strongly associated with
‘aware’ than ‘see’—where the association is strong enough to support a prominent
epistemic use (‘I see your point’), arguably interpreted with the common metaphor-
interpretation strategy of stereotype-feature transfer (Bortfeld and McGlone 2001;
Searle 1993). Plausibility ratings elicited in a comprehension study with eye tracking
confirmed that, where contextually irrelevant and unsupported, spatial patient features
(X is before S) get completely suppressed in interpreting ‘aware’ (though not ‘see’)
sentences (Fischer and Engelhardt 2019); this suggests they are weakly associated
with ‘aware’. We tentatively conclude that, in the ‘aware’ stereotype, epistemic agent
features are very strongly associated with the verb, whereas the other features are
weakly associated.
Application of the representativeness heuristic to the present input therefore would
deliver a negative judgment: Premise (1) tells us that the object viewed is round.
Integration of (C) (‘The viewer thinks that the object viewed is elliptical’) with this
contextual information leads to the conclusion that the viewer has a wrong belief about
the coin, and does not know that it is round, or that there is a round coin. This input
suggests that conformity with the ‘aware’ stereotype is low: The agent lacks the most
highly weighted component feature of the stereotype, and the other component features
have such a low weighting that even conformity with all remaining features could not
compensate the lack. Application of the representativeness heuristic therefore delivers
the judgment that (more likely than not) the viewer is not aware of the round coin (
2 above).
This conclusion is strengthened, rather than defeated, by the common qualifier
‘directly’: The philosophical notion of ‘direct awareness’ does not cancel epistemic
implications but rather imposes the stricter requirement that the relevant knowledge
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be acquired without conscious inference or other intellectual process (Price 1932, p. 3;
Russell 1912, p. 4; cf. Fischer 2011, pp. 114–116).23 Hence the ignorant viewer is not
‘directly aware’ of the round coin, either.
Further empirical evidence is required to support (H3) and this explanation of the key
inference in the argument from illusion, from (1) to (2) (see Sect. 7.5). If confirmed,
however, our explanation resolves at any rate the early 20th century version of the
paradox by exposing in its very first step an automatic stereotypical inference, from
(1) to (C), which is contextually inappropriate and leads to a conclusion proponents
of the argument explicitly reject but presuppose in further reasoning: They typically
intend to use appearance- and perception-verbs in a ‘phenomenal’ sense devoid of
their usual factive, epistemic, or even doxastic implications (Ayer 1956, p. 90; Jackson
1977, pp. 33–49; cf. Chisholm 1957, pp. 44–48; Maund 1986), so that the inference
is not licensed by the intended sense of ‘appear’ and its cognates. Second, proponents
explicitly acknowledge that, in the familiar cases at issue, viewers confidently judge
that things actually have some shape, size, or colour distinct from the one they look
under the circumstances (e.g., Ayer 1956, p. 88; Broad 1923, pp. 236–237, 241; cf.
Price 1932, p. 27). Finally, also the inference from (C) to (2) is defective: Since ‘is
aware of’ is one of the perception verbs proponents of the argument want to use in a
phenomenal sense, the verb’s epistemic implications should be completely suppressed.
This impugns those rare versions of the argument that proceed from unfamiliar cases
of illusion, where viewers are taken in.
7.3 Paradox resolution
To explore whether our diagnostic hypothesis can meaningfully contribute to resolv-
ing the paradox, we now examine whether it can be extended to the currently most
prominent version of the argument from illusion (Robinson 2001, pp. 57–58; Smith
2002, pp. 25–27; cf. Crane and French 2015; Fish 2010, pp. 12–13). Early 20th century
authors leaped from case-descriptions (1 above) to negative conclusions (2 above), and
based ‘phenomenal’ judgments on these (above). By contrast, more recent authors base
negative conclusions (like 5 below) on ‘phenomenal’ judgments (3 below), inferred
from case-descriptions with the ‘Phenomenal Principle’ (2 below). E.g.:
1. When subjects view a round coin sideways, the coin appears elliptical to them.
2. Whenever something appears a shape, size, or colour F to observers, they are
(directly) aware of something that actually is F. Hence:
3. When subjects view a round coin sideways, they are (directly) aware of something
that actually is elliptical (an elliptical patch).
4. If b has a property a lacks, a b. (Leibniz’ Law)
5. When subjects view a coin sideways, they are (directly) aware of something other
than the round coin (an elliptical ‘sense-datum’).
Again, the remainder of the argument generalises to all cases of visual perception. We
now outline for further follow-up an empirically informed analysis which will suggest
23 Some authors exclude inferences by admitting as objects of ‘direct awareness’ only things to which
the appearance/reality-distinction does not apply (e.g. Ayer 1940, pp. 59, 61, 69), so that no inference is
required to find out whether they merely appear or actually are F (cf. Broad 1923, pp. 239–240, 248).
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– against first appearances to the contrary – that (H3) applies also to this version of
the argument.
The Phenomenal Principle has been either advanced to explain the phenomenal
character of our perceptual experience (Broad 1923, pp. 240–241; cf. Smith 2002,
pp. 36–37; Fish 2010, p. 6) or treated as obvious or intuitive (e.g., Price 1932, p. 63;
Robinson 2001, p. 54). We now argue that thinkers only regard the principle as intuitive
when they presuppose the negative conclusion (5 above) it is meant to support, so that
at least where the principle is treated as obvious or intuitive, the present version of
the argument continues to rely at its earliest stage on the negative conclusion (H3) can
explain.24
Intuitive plausibility results from high fluency of the underlying processes (Sim-
mons and Nelson 2006), and promotes swift acceptance of judgments (Thompson
et al. 2011) and ex-post rationalisations of initial responses (Shynkaruk and Thompson
2006). Syntactic complexity reduces fluency (Lowrey 1989), and abstract or general
wording reduces the effect of fluency on judgments (Tsai and Thomas 2011). This
suggests that what strikes proponents of the argument as intuitive is not the general
principle, in its abstract formulation (which many students find outright incompre-
hensible, until given concrete examples), but rather particular phenomenal judgments,
phrased in syntactically simple and concrete terms. The relevant phrasing in state-
ments of the argument is that ‘viewers are aware of an elliptical patch’ (cf. Price 1932,
p. 3) or ‘speck’ (e.g., Ayer 1940, pp. 22–23). These statements express the intuitions
to which the argument has been held to appeal (e.g., Robinson 2001, p. 54). The gen-
eral principle is then formulated only in efforts to transform intuitive reasoning into
a deductive argument, namely, to turn the inference of phenomenal judgments from
initial case descriptions into a deductive inference, and it is accepted as ‘intuitive’
due to the intuitive plausibility of the particular phenomenal judgments it appears to
justify.
The intuitive judgments that thus do all the work have the form ‘S is aware of an
F patch’. ‘F patch’ has a literal use, which attributes F-ness to a patch of some sort,
and a metaphorical use, which refers to something by saying it looks like an F patch
(perhaps from here, now).25 We employ the latter, e.g., when we cannot tell what it
is we are looking at (‘Do you see the small red patch in the valley? Might that be our
24 This conclusion will arguably also apply where the Phenomenal Principle (PP) is invoked on explanatory
grounds. E.g., C.D. Broad (1923) invokes the PP to explain ‘why the penny should seem elliptical rather
than of any other shape’. But, as Broad grants, familiar ‘laws of perspective’ explain this (p. 235); what
these laws supposedly cannot explain is ‘the compatibility of these changing elliptical appearances … with
the … constancy and roundness of the physical object’ (p. 236). This compatibility problem arises from an
apparent tension between, e.g., the object’s elliptical appearance and the fact that it is round. Since people
ordinarily expect round objects to look elliptical from various perspectives (Austin 1962, p. 26), the felt
tension is only generated by the expectation that when something appears F there should be something
that is F. Without such prior commitment to the PP, this specific explanatory challenge does not arise.
Alternatively, authors insist that only instantiations of F can ‘adequately explain’ why our experience of
an F-looking thing is as it is (Fish 2010, p. 6)—without considering scientific explanations, which take a
different line (review: Clark 1996). Either way, thinkers seem committed to the PP from the start, instead
of basing their acceptance of it on an inference to the best explanation, and our account below may apply.
25 The common feature transfer strategy (Bortfeld and McGlone 2001; Ortony 1993; Searle 1993) has
language users select one or more stereotypical implications of the dominant (literal) sense of an expression,
as metaphorical interpretation. Here, we select the stereotypical looks of the literal referent.
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car?’), or when we wish to avoid the stereotypical implication that the agent knows
what it is she is seeing (‘She watched the small specks climbing towards her, and
would have fled, had she recognised them as her pursuers.’), in line with the speaker’s
maxim of the M-heuristic: ‘Use unusual (marked) expressions for stereotype-deviant
situations’, where marked expressions ‘contrast with those you would use to describe
the corresponding stereotypical situation’ (Levinson 2000, p. 136). There is then no
suggestion that ‘F patch’ refers to something that actually is F (the small red patch
may turn out to be a big SUV).
On a literal interpretation of the phrase, phenomenal intuitions like ‘The viewer
is aware of an elliptical patch’ are controversial, and take for granted too much of
what the argument needs to show. We therefore submit that any pre-theoretical accep-
tance of them as obvious is due to metaphorical interpretation: ‘Elliptical patch’ then
refers to the round coin just mentioned before. Thus understood, the judgment is pre-
philosophically uncontroversial. But this metaphorical interpretation does not support
the key moves required by the argument from illusion: First, it does not support gen-
eralization from intuitive inferences (which lead from specific case descriptions to
particular phenomenal judgments), to the Phenomenal Principle that whenever some-
thing appears F, observers are aware of something that actually is F. Alternatively,
proponents of the argument could base inferences with Leibniz’ Law directly on intu-
itive phenomenal judgments. But, second, their metaphorical interpretation does not
permit such inferences, either (cf. ‘That small red patch cannot be our car—our SUV
is big’). The argument thus requires the switch to a literal interpretation.
This switch can be explained by the partial match heuristic for determining refer-
ence, which has been invoked to explain semantic illusions (Barton and Sanford 1993;
Kamas et al. 1996; Park and Reder 2004): ‘Pick the domain element semantically
most similar to the stimulus concept, if the similarity exceeds a threshold; otherwise,
assume the expression has a referent satisfying the concept, outside the domain of
discourse.’ This heuristic has us initially interpret ‘elliptical patch’ as referring to the
reasonably similar sole object mentioned—the coin which then looks similar to an
elliptical patch. But any further negative conclusion to the effect that the viewer is
unaware of the round coin will remove this object from the relevant domain of dis-
course (objects of awareness). The partial match heuristic then has people posit a new
object, not introduced by the premises, which satisfies the description on the default
literal interpretation.
We therefore submit that the current textbook version of the argument from illusion
relies on the same inference from initial case descriptions to negative conclusions
that earlier versions explicitly endorsed. Only these negative conclusions effect the
switch in the interpretation of phenomenal judgments that allows proponents of the
argument to first regard them as intuitive or pre-philosophically uncontroversial and
then rationalize intuitive inferences to phenomenal judgments with the Phenomenal
Principle that supposedly licences them.
This means that implicit reliance on intuitive phenomenal judgments and Leibniz’
Law cannot explain how negative conclusions are obtained, in the first place. By con-
trast, the ‘textbook reasoning’ can be explained by the hypothesis (H3) that initial case
descriptions trigger contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences to attributions
of doxastic attitudes (‘The viewer thinks the coin is elliptical’) and ignorance (since
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the coin is round). The moment we ask, ‘What is the viewer aware of?’, the speaker’s
maxim of the M-heuristic has us respond to inferred ignorance by opting for the marked
expression ‘an elliptical patch’, which signals deviation from relevant stereotypes and
is often used to avoid the stereotypical implication that the viewer knows what she is
viewing (above). The moment we ask, ‘Is the viewer aware of the round coin?’, the
same ignorance attribution has the representativeness heuristic deliver the negative
judgment that the viewer is not aware of the coin (Sect. 7.2). The automatic doxastic
inference thus facilitates both phenomenal judgments and negative conclusions. And
only the interpretation of those judgments in the light of these conclusions supports
the Phenomenal Principle.
Contextually inappropriate doxastic inferences from appearance verbs thus seem to
provide the best available explanation for the spontaneous inferences from initial case
descriptions to negative conclusions (‘The viewer is not aware of the coin’) which
we submit are crucially involved in both early analytic and current versions of the
argument from illusion. If so, the explanation warrants the evaluative conclusion that
both versions ultimately rely on contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences. In
addition, it identifies at the root of the more recent version a fallacy of equivocation:
Phenomenal judgments (‘… elliptical patch’) receive a metaphorical interpretation
when accepted as intuitive or obvious, but a literal interpretation in acceptance of the
Phenomenal Principle that supposedly licenses them. We tentatively conclude that
(H3) can meaningfully contribute towards a resolution of this classic paradox about
perception.
7.4 Problem-‘dissolution’
Arguments from illusion lead from uncontroversial premises to the conclusion that
when we use our five senses, we are never (directly) aware of physical objects, but
only of sense-data. Together with ‘arguments from hallucination’ for the same conclu-
sion, they generate the ‘problem of perception’ (Crane and French 2015; Fish 2009;
Smith 2002). This is the problem of reconciling the conclusion of these paradoxes,
or as much of these arguments as one still accepts, with the common-sense convic-
tions with which it appears to conflict. It thus exemplifies a recurrent structure: It is
a ‘paradox-generated reconciliation problem’ (Fischer 2011). Theoretical responses
try to solve such problems by showing that, properly understood, the parties to the
apparent conflict are mutually consistent (Dancy 1985). Diagnostic responses try to
resolve such problems by identifying mistakes in the underlying paradoxes. Relevant
‘mistakes’ can range from substantive theoretical presuppositions and implicit general
principles that are wrong (Papineau 2009; Williams 1996) to contextually inappropri-
ate default inferences (Austin 1962). Diagnostic responses can involve either more or
less empirical argument and theoretical reflection about the topic under investigation
(say, sense-perception): the assessment of implicit theories and principles will typi-
cally involve more, the examination of contextually inappropriate default inferences
perhaps less.
We propose to give more precise content to the distinction between ‘solving’ and
‘dissolving’ such problems by considering to what extent responses require the acqui-
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sition of new theoretical or empirical knowledge about the topic under investigation.
The less such knowledge they require, the more ‘solutions’ turn into ‘dissolutions’.26
While they do not require the acquisition of knowledge about the topic under investiga-
tion (say, sense-perception), they may involve the acquisition of semantic knowledge
about words used in discussion about that topic (Austin 1962, p. 5) (semantic dissolu-
tion) or of psychological knowledge about the cognitive processes that drive reasoning
about that topic (and the formulation of the paradox, in particular), as well as about the
cognitive structures that support these processes (Fischer 2011, pp. 218–223; Weinberg
2017, p. 179) (psychological dissolution).27
Both approaches can target different defects for exposure. As traditionally con-
ceived (e.g., Hanfling 2000; cf. Hansen 2014), OLP seeks to expose semantic defects,
namely, lack of meaning or truth, in philosophical questions or the assumptions or con-
clusions that motivate them. Alternatively, however, diagnostic responses may seek
to expose epistemic defects, namely, show proponents lack justification for some of
the assumptions or conclusions that engender the problem (Fischer 2011, pp. 61–72).
Paradoxical arguments provide prima facie justification for conclusions that engender
reconciliation problems. Exposing fallacies in such arguments then provides an under-
cutting defeater (Pollock 1986, p. 39) that undermines that prima facie justification.
By identifying fallacies in the very first step of arguments from illusion, this paper
provides proponents of these arguments with an undercutting defeater for their rea-
sons to accept already the arguments’ initial conclusions. This contributes to showing
that the paradox-generated reconciliation problem is ill-motivated. Together with a
parallel diagnostic response to the argument from hallucination (Fischer and Engel-
hardt 2017, 2019, under review), the proposed diagnostic account may ‘dissolve’ the
problem of perception: If further vindicated, it will show this problem ill-motivated,
and will show this by depending on facts about verbal cognition, rather than about
sense-perception.
The more glaring the fallacies are that a diagnostic response attributes to a philo-
sophical paradox, the more urgent it is to support the diagnosis through empirical
accounts that explain when and why competent thinkers commit those fallacies (Tha-
gard and Nisbett 1983). Diagnostic responses to paradox-generated problems can
receive such support from second-generation contributions to restrictionist experi-
mental philosophy (see Sect. 1). These seek to develop epistemological profiles of
automatic cognitive processes that tell us under which conditions we may (not) rely
on their outputs (Weinberg 2015, 2016). By showing that the paradox is formulated
under vitiating conditions (like those identified by the Salience Bias Hypothesis) where
automatic language processes that are generally reliable lead to inappropriate infer-
ences, we can vindicate attribution of the resulting fallacies to competent thinkers—and
develop psychological dissolutions of paradox-generated problems.
26 This criterion is inspired by Wittgenstein ([1933] 2005), who wished to ‘completely dissolve’ some
philosophical problems (p. 421) and suggested that ‘taking care of a philosophical problem is not a matter
of pronouncing new truths about the subject of the investigation’ (p. 416).
27 For discussion of how this approach is in line with a new ‘metaphilosophical naturalism’, while deviating
from traditional ‘first-order methodological naturalism’, see Fischer and Collins (2015) and Fischer (2018a).
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7.5 Limitations and future research
Our study used a plausibility-ranking task to examine (H1) and (H2), and provide indi-
rect evidence of contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance
verbs. More direct evidence can be provided by online measures including reading
time measurements with eye tracking (Patson and Warren 2010; Rayner 1998), and
comprehension experiments with pupillometry (Kahneman 1973; Laeng et al. 2012).
We used both techniques to document contextually inappropriate stereotypical infer-
ences from perception-verbs (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017, 2019) which may drive
arguments from hallucination. We plan to use these techniques to follow up the present
investigation of appearance verbs, to provide direct evidence of contextually inappro-
priate doxastic inferences.
To provide initial empirical support for the metaphilosophical hypothesis (H3), this
paper presented evidence that the ‘aware’-stereotype has a structure which ensures
that input from the documented doxastic inferences would lead the representative-
ness heuristic to yield negative judgments (like ‘The viewer is not aware of the coin’)
(Sect. 7.2). Follow-up experiments will examine whether this heuristic is actually
used in moving from premises of arguments from illusion to such negative conclu-
sions. Relevant experiments include, e.g., plausibility assessments where participants
assess answers to questions about cases described by the arguments’ premises (e.g.,
‘The round coin appears elliptical to Joe’). Questions employ either ‘see’ or ‘aware’
(‘Does Joe see/Is Joe aware of/the round coin?’). ‘see’ is less strongly associated with
epistemic and doxastic agent-properties than ‘is aware of’, and more strongly with the
other components of its associated stereotype. If participants employ the representa-
tiveness heuristic to answer the question, doxastic inferences from appearance verbs
should affect answers to ‘aware’-questions more strongly, and negative answers should
be deemed more plausible in response to ‘aware’questions than ‘see’-counterparts.
This paper has examined one source of the fallacies we identified in the classical
paradoxes we considered: Automatic inferences with the I-heuristic and the represen-
tativeness heuristic lead to conclusions (e.g., ‘the viewer is unaware of the coin’) which
appear to clash with background beliefs and contextual inferences (e.g., ‘the viewer
is aware of something’). But perceived conflicts lead to lower subjective confidence
and plausibility (De Neys et al. 2011) and increased critical scrutiny (Thompson et al.
2011). Arguably, the inferences at the root of arguments from illusion (and hallucina-
tion) only strike their proponents as so intuitively plausible because they believe from
the outset in the existence of a complementary perceptual space, ‘the mind’, in which
objects of awareness can be placed when evicted from the viewer’s physical environ-
ment. Accordingly, one of us has developed a debunking explanation of introspective
conceptions of the mind that have traditionally struck proponents of these arguments
as intuitively plausible (Fischer 2014b, 2018b). How this conception and contextually
inappropriate stereotypical inferences interact to generate these paradoxes and the
‘problem of perception’ remains to be examined.
Further profitable applications may include examination of inferences from the
verb ‘to know’: Experimental philosophers have started to collect data relevant for
assessing the salience of its different senses or uses (Hansen et al. under review).
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Experimental and ordinary language philosophers have clarified philosophically rele-
vant uses, including infallibilist uses (Nichols and Pinillos 2018) and uses according
varying relevance to relevant alternatives (Baz 2017), suggesting interesting hypothe-
ses about how skeptical paradoxes and other epistemological problems may arise from
contextually inappropriate inferences from the verb. We would welcome application
of the approach presented, to these and further problems.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides critical ordinary language philosophy with fresh, empirical foun-
dations. Critical OLP examined default inferences from words, which have subtle
contextual defeaters. It sought to ‘dissolve’ philosophical problems by disentangling
such inferences. Our Salience Bias Hypothesis identifies a first set of conditions under
which even competent speakers make contextually inappropriate stereotypical infer-
ences: Such inferences occur when speakers give a word with a clearly dominant
sense rarefied uses for whose interpretation the dominant sense is functional. This is
liable to happen when philosophers give special uses to words that already have well-
established uses in ordinary discourse. Our psycholinguistic hypothesis thus lends
empirical substance to Austin’s observation that ‘tampering with words … is always
liable to have unforeseen repercussions… we must always be particularly wary of the
philosophical habit of dismissing some (if not all) the ordinary uses of a word as “unim-
portant”’ (Austin 1962, p. 63). We must be wary because ordinary uses may be most
salient and continue to shape automatic inferences; and ‘unforeseen repercussions’
include inappropriate inferences from rarefied uses (say, technical uses resulting from
well-motivated philosophical ‘tampering’), which go through especially in uninfor-
mative contexts (typical of philosophical arguments). The Salience Bias Hypothesis
thus provides an empirical rationale for critical OLP.
Three cross-linguistic experiments supported the psycholinguistic hypothesis by
providing evidence for contextually inappropriate doxastic inferences from phenome-
nal uses of appearance verbs, and their robustness in the face of competing pragmatic
inferences. We empirically developed the metaphilosophical hypothesis that the docu-
mented inferences are at the root of classical paradoxes about perception (‘arguments
from illusion’). Philosophical problems arising from such paradoxes can be resolved
by identifying the inappropriate inferences involved. Where inferences remain tacit, or
their attribution would otherwise violate principles of charity, experimental evidence
is required. Psycholinguistic experiments can provide such evidence. Psycholinguistic
methods and findings thus motivate and support a more widely applicable ‘criti-
cal’ approach in experimental ordinary language philosophy that seeks to ‘dissolve’
paradox-generated problems by disentangling context-sensitive inferences language
users automatically make from words.28
28 For helpful comments on previous drafts, the authors thank two anonymous reviewers as well as James
Andow, Avner Baz, Chi-He Elder, Rachel Giora, Nat Hansen, Jennifer Nado, and conference audiences in
Turku (Finland, May 2017) and Osnabrück (Germany, November 2017). Linguist Akiko Tomatsuri kindly
provided advice on the development of Japanese materials. For help with gathering and entering English,
German, and Japanese data, respectively, we thank Oliver Afridijanta, Karolin Meinert, and Junichiro
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